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The Crumbling
Pax-Africana
A Political Analysis

ILLUSTRATION BY BRUCE FAGIN

By Gilbert Keith Bluwey

The abundance of rich natural and human
resources aside, Africa today remains the
sleeping giant of our time. Witness the
continuing wave of big-power confrontation in several parts of the continent - a
confrontat ion that carri es ominous impli cations for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and econom ic well-being of the
continent as a whole. This exposes the
dup l icily and tortuousness of the moral
pretentions of big-powers toward Africa.
It a lso vindicates the fears expressed by
the early nationalists against the spectre
of neoco lonialism in its very embryonic
stages.
The combined effects of widespread
poverty in weak and dependent economies, and the complex web of internal
contradictions in the African setting , has
generated situations very receptive to the
bait of big-power pretentions. From the
Horn down to the Cape , and throughout
the Soudan and the Zambezi regions , the
post- independence condition of Afri ca
reacts with the precision of a robot to the
whims of big-power manipulations.
The story of the second scramble for
Africa is well-known . The granting of political independence to ind ividua l African
states did not bring a cessation of the
centuries-old master-servant relation ship
with the retiring co lonizers. Indeed , the
event se rved not only to exhibit the vast
economic potential and strategic imporNEW DIRECTIONS JANUARY 1979

tance of Africa in the international chessgame, but also to expose the helplessness
of the African states against foreign designs on their sovereignty. Moscow and
Peking , along with their satellites from the
East, made an early debut in the fray
while Washington and the West set out to
fortify and expand their already secure
frontiers .
The more perceptive ones among the
African nationalists clearly understood
the policy implications of the new phase
-of big-power pretentions toward Africa
and denounced it as neocolonialism. In
the words of Ghana's pioneer nationalist
Kwame Kkrumah , " ... Once a territory has
become nominally independent, it is no
longer possib le, as it was in the last century, to reverse the process. Exist ing colonies may linger on but no new colonies
wi ll be created. In place of co lonia li sm as
· the main instrument of imperialism, we
have today neo-colonialism. The essence
of neocolonialism is that the State which
is subject to it is, in theory, independent
and has al I the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality , its economic system and thus its pol itical policy
is directed from outside."
Neo-co lonial ism under this persuasion
presents a threat to the sovereig nty of the
state, because it denies the people of the
new state the freed om to evolve their
own autonomous poli ti ca l and economic
systems.

=-

Progress ive African nationalists, in
action to the deliberately precipitant · drawal of French bureaucracy f Guinea in 1958, and the foreign-ind u
imbroglio in the Congo (June 190C
stepped up the call for practical steps wrest Africa free of neocolonialistdes ig The seven Casab lanca bloc of statesGhana, the United Arab Republ ic, Gu inEE.
Ma li , Libya, Morocco and Algeria - specifically ca lled for an immediate politiCG.
union of all Africa committed to sociar
reconstructi on along with an African H i ~ 
Command fo r the defense of the le ·
torial integrity of the continental uniorgovernment
For various w id ely known and hotly debated reason s, a larger grouping of 29
African states, dominated by Nigeria anc
Liberia, rejected the union idea as wel l as
the creation of an African High Commanc
and the introduction of a program for the
socialist reconstruction of Afri can sociel)
and economy. Instead , they called for 2
gradual and functional approach towaro
"the ultimate goal of political unification.
Bitter inter-persona l acrimony and ideological rift followed , kee ping Africa divided for three long years during whi ch
time the supe r powe rs fortified their holdings on the cont inent The compromi se
charter of unity and cooperati on which
emerged at the first full y representative
conference of the newly formed Organization of African Unity (OAU) in Addi s Ababa
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May 23, 1963, proved a patch-work of
;:;ontradictions. The OAU , which in intent
::md purpose represents the co Ilective wi 11
:md power of Africa against the forces of
eocolonialism has been endowed with
::. structure too weak to meet its basic
:::ommitment. Its governing principles are
= so fraught with contradictions which
TNV haunt the best intentions of its found~ s.
The more serious structural defects in
;;1e OAU were the absence of an executive
3'.lvereign to control and direct develop-.ents on the continent, and the failure to
::--eate an African High Command to
='uard against pre-emptive assaults on
-.ember nations. Openly suspicious of
- progressive platform for an immediate
::urrender of territorial sovereignty to a
tinental government, Africa's leaders
1963 created the OAU, a loose associ- - n of equal states with no determinate
tral direction. An annual conference
:= heads of state was chartered to review
- vnts on the continent for the preceeding
::ar and to agree on areas of cooperation
:he ensuing year. Foreign ministers of
-:ember states constituted a Council of
isters, which would meet quarterly to
? iew developments on the continent. A
=.:llllmittee on Arbitration and Conciliawas also formed to attempt peaceful
lution of conflict situations among
-smber states. By deliberate ly creating
obvious vacancy at the command-post,

the OAU sought a peace structure based
upon the pure good faith of its members.
That obvious omission, in time, became
an intolerable burden on the self-restraint
of member states with revolutionary inclinations who set out under various guises
to subvert a peace structure which they
helped fashion.

"The seeds of the present
day concept of national selfdetermination were sowed
in the turbulence and
resistance that followed the
18th century partitions of
Poland, the American and
French revolutions of the
18th century and the
declaration of the war aims
of the Allied powers in
World War I/'
An important pretext for subverting the
OAU's pax Africana was provided by the
organization 's charter. Overwhelmed by a
common desire to work for the speedy
dismantling of the remaining enclaves of
colonialism, the charter averred to the
principles of national self-determination
The obvious intent of that declaration was
to provide an authentic moral basis upon
which to rally world-wide support for the

intended total assau It on the pol ic;ies of
assimilation and apartheid which sti II held
sway in Portuguese and South African
colonial thinking. In other words, selfdetermination within the context of the
OAU would be acceptable only for territories as a whole and not for ethnic groupings. Such an interpretation would be in
consonance with the OAU's act (noted
earlier) of legitimizing the arbitrary and
unnatural territorial boundaries bequeathed to each of its members by the
respective retiring colonial power.
Indeed, self-determination has never
been accorded universal application in
any historical context. The seeds of the
present-day concept of national selfdetermination were sowed in the turbulence and resistance that followed the 18th
century partitions of Poland, the American
and French revolutions of the 18th cen tury and the declaration of the war aims
of the Al lied powers in World War I. Alfred
Cobban , in a highly instructive discussion
of the subject, observed that although the
Al lied Powers, as represented by President Woodrow Wilson of the United States,
gave the broadest and the most liberal
exposition to the concept , they meant it to
have only a limited application .
Cobban's view was that the Wilsonian
concept of national self-determination referred exc lusively to those areas of Europe
and Asia which were under the sovereign
jurisdiction of the defeated powers of
NEW DIRECTIONS JANUARY 1979

20

mand to guard against territoria l encroachments . Again , events subsequent
to the rejection of the- pro posa l for High
Command clearly vind icate the progressive forces and negate the fears expressed by the reacti onarie s.
The place of military migh t in the power
relations among states cannot be overemphasized. As a rul e, the level of a
state's military preparedness is a meas.. as far as the question of secession of
ure of its actua l powe r. Credible detera particular section of a member state
rance, therefore , requires man ifest fightis concerned, the United Nation 's attiing power. There is little doubt that the
tude is unequivocal. As an international
white minority and Ian Sm ith of Rhodesia
organization , the UNO. has never acwould have capitulated to an Afri can Hi gh
cepted and does not accept, and I do
Command. The recent series of military
not believe it will ever accept the
promanades deep into Angolan and Moprinciple of secession of a part of its
zambiquean territories by South African
member-state."
troops , and into Zambia by Rhodesi an
In addition , the 15th Session of the UN
forces , would not have been contemplated
General Assembly (1963) adopted the
in the face of an African High Command .
following resolution ,
The embarrassing situation to Africa cre"Any attempt aimed at the partial or ated by the perpetual inability of the fighttotal disruption of the national unity ing forces of Zaire to expel marauding
and territorial integrity of a country is bands of mercenary fighters from the
incompatible with the purposes and strategic province of Shaba would have
principles of the Charter of the United been offset by an African High Command.
Nations Organization."
Also the existance of an African Hi gh
Pious declarations, however, are never Command would have helped ease tenenough to restrain the ambitions of revo- sion among nations with trad itional bounlutionary leaders. Thus, in the absence of dary disputes. In short, an African High
potential deterrence, member states of Command would have offered the deterthe OAU , as indeed every other ambitious rance necessary to keep fore ign forces
state in the international system, nurse out of the continent and also restrain
territori al amb itions and often attempt the ambitions of restive leaders on the
their implementation.
continent.
It must be remembered also that the
Wh ile the rejection of the idea of an
prospect of reuniting kingdoms and ethn ic African High Command di d not mean
groups arbitrarily held apart by colonial that the statesmen were unaware of porule provided much of the spark to nation- tential threats to the sovere ignty of indialism . To confound such a cherished ex- vidual African states, they nevertheless
pectation , even when the guard s have saw those threats emanating from their
been changed , means to perpetuate a neighbors. Th us, the conservative African
fundamental mistake of colonialism . Re- leaders opted for va rious types of desistance is unlikely to abate merely be- fence de entete with foreign powers cause the internal colonizer has a skin usually with the retiring colonial power.
co lor identical to those of the co lonized It That option , unwittingly legi timatized
ap pears that the good faith of the founding continued fore ign mi litary presence and
fathers in the self-restraint of generati ons vi rtually reserved to France and Britain
of African leaders has been misplaced. the right to intervene with troops to mainThe progressive forces lost also on tain the status quo.
The foregoing backdrop should offer a
their demand for an African Hi gh Com-

World War I. The concept was given further force and form by the third article of
the Atlantic charter (1941) and thereafter
became the ideologica l weapon wh ich
liberation movements throughout the
world wielded to wrest themselves free of
foreign political domin at ion. In recent
times, a Secretary General of the United
Nation s Organization (U Thant) asse rted
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basis for analyzi ng recent waves of er._
military intervention in Africa. In b~ terms , two types of conf lict situati
plague the continent today. There a:=
Conflict situations centeri ng around
der disputes, and the principle of sc-determination between groups of in
pendent African states. These c_ =
repres ented by the conflict in the Hom Africa, the dispute over the Spanish hara and the se rie s of border squabb =
and ski rmi shes in West and Central Afri
In none of these situati ons has either
OAU or any of the parties in conflict bee-able to pu rsue stated goa ls without .=
benefi t of foreign assistance. The 0 • _
never articulated a definitive position these confl ict situat ions. Diplomatics .._port and alliance tend to change overn i and without regard to principles. Forei_
powers, on the othe r hand , find the g -running business attendant upon su conflict situations extreme ly lucrative af'=
gleefully remain involved.

=

=

"... the unconditional
surrender of the racist
regimes - at least in
Zimbabwe and Namibiawould likely come as a
result of continued armed
struggle."
The con fl ict situati ons in Southern Africa
-Zi mbabwe, Namibia and Azania collective ly-assume a different character.
In those enclaves, progressive liberation
forces who are allied with the socialist
camp are p itted against reactionary and
racist regimes.
Western diplomatic strategists have so
far reacted by offering to mediate a
sett lement of each conf li ct situation
through peace plans worked out in places
like Wash ington and London. In any event,
the uncond itional su rrender of the rac ist
regimes-at least in Zimbabwe and Namib ia - would likely come as a result of
conti nued armed struggle. In the case of

czania, it is difficult to anticipate the in- itable turn of events there once Zim33.bwe and Namibia capitulate to na- nalist forces. Possibly, a fencemending
:JOlicy by the foe could go a long way to
"BStrict the conflict with in the bounds of
ilized accommodation.
. The raging plague of Africa requires a
roug h purification of the social enviment in order to provide a lasting cu re .
ical ly, the right answe rs sti 11 Iie in the
: d dreams: The formation of a continenta l
:lion government and a military High
....ommand.

pes, for example, would curtail imports
and reduce or even eliminate national
nutritional dependence on the generosity
of foreign powers.
The second and equally urgent need is
for the African states to develop credible
deterrence capabil iti es. Such a program
should include the formation of regional
defense pacts, joint research into the development of weapons technology and
the total exclusion of non-African fighting
personnel from every independent African
state.

If a continental government offers the
.:est hope for finding lasting solutions to
- 7ica's woes and problems, its attai n-en! seems a fairly remote possibility.
....ertain options become imperatives in
-.e interim. In the first place, the nations
fr ica should strive for econom ic selficiency at least within regional group- s. This would require positive steps
- at would give meaning to the widely
- dered theories of self-reliance and
=.__,1eti onal cooperation within regional
nomic unions. In this regard , a new
-eaning must be given to the concept of
-- elopment which should now be seen
~ he attempt to provide for the material
-ee<:J s of a people through th e maximum
- ization of the resou rces of their own
ironment
Similary, the level of development of
- mcular African societies should cease
oe measured by the volume and so-:,-- tication of the imports which its
- pie use. Development within the Afri- - context should reflect the extent to
- ich the good Iife is supported through
-c:o utilization of resou rces available in
- a African environment It is a false hope
- expect to make a distinctively African
ri bution to wor ld civilization by ma-::: lating non-African artifacts. In other
_ ds, the existing appendage economic
_=ems should give way to national econ-es which would ensure that the mate- needs of the African people are met
::.:.rgh African resources. Widespread
_ _endence upon authentic African reci-

"... the patchwork of African
states share identical
national interests and
therefore common national
enemies."

=-

The nation-states of Africa, collective ly
constitute a natural security community:
The high rate of communication and contact across national frontiers is unlikely to
diminish in view of the strength of crossnational ethnic links on the one hand , and
the strength of the pan-Africanist fervor
on the other hand. Besides, the relative
absence of entrenched ideologica l rivalry
among the African states and th e universal
nature of the problems and goals of the
individual states reduces the likelihood
of intractable conflict situations and holds
up prospects for cooperation among African states.
Thus , although very often at odds with
each other, the patchwork of African states
share id entica l national interests and
therefore common national enemies. A
tacit, and perhaps unwitting expression of
the identity of interests among the African
states, is the unbroken history of c lose
diplomatic cooperation on a myriad of issues of mutual interest since the formation of the OAU . But effective diplomacy
is one that is supported by a credible deterence capability.
It is imperative, therefore , that once they
adopt common foreign policy goals, the
African states should provide the military

establishment necessary to support the
pursuit of those goals. This means that the
establishment of inter-state , then regional
military groups should proceed along
with the establishment of cultural and
economic links among the states of the
continent
By pooling their military resources into
large reg ional units, the African states
would be in a position to effectively deter
foreign mercenary adventurers from manipulating African issues to their own
advantage.
As a corollary to the establishment of at
least regional mil itary forces , the development of military sc ience, rooted in the
African environment, shou Id be vigorously
promoted. In other words , African weapons and African fighting methods should
progressively repl ace the existing total
dependence on external aid so as to ensure meaningful deterrence capability .
There is need also for the promotion of
ideological communion throughout Africa ,
if only to ensure easy identification of the
continent's common enemies and common friends. In other words , the same
scrup les that ruffle the minds of the Western free enterprise wor ld about Communist gains in Italy (since 1976) and Ru ssian missile build-up in Cuba (1960-62)
and which cause discomfiture in the Kremlin over growing liberalism in Czechoslovakia , (1968-69) should arouse the concern of African leaders when their
neighbors make overtures to the common
enemy. The instruction of th.e celebrated
Edmund Burke of 18th century British po1itical fame is that ".
. whenever our
neighbor's house is on fire, it cannot be
amiss for the engines to play a little on our
own." D
Gilbert Bluwey, PhD . is an assistant professor with
the Social Sciences Department at Howard University.
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